

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 SAM-01 DRC-01 /120 W

----- 115396

R 120710Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6808

INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

USUN NEW YORK 638

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TUNIS 5635/1

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG XA XB XG XM XF

SUBJECT: KHMER-ARAB RELATIONS: DEMARCHE TO GOT

REF: STATE 192437; 197515

1. SUMMARY: I DISCUSSED KHMER UNGA REPRESENTATION  
ISSUE WITH FON MIN CHATTI MORNING SEPT 11. HE SAID  
GOT WOULD GIVE FURTHER PROFOUND THOUGHT TO MATTER OF  
VOTE AT UNGA. WHILE GOT CONTINUES TO RECOGNIZE  
SIHANOUK, IT HAS DEEP INTEREST IN PEACE, SETTLEMENT OF  
DISPUTES THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, AND PRESERVATION OF RULE  
OF LAW. CHATTI SAID GOT WILL BE TALKING WITH MANY OTHERS  
ABOUT KHMER ISSUE BEFORE DECIDING AND LEFT IMPRESSION  
HE WOULD TAKE USG VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT. END SUMMARY.

2. CHATTI RECEIVED ME SEPT 11 FOR FORTY-FIVE MINUTES.  
I SAID I HAD BEEN UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM SECRETARY TO  
DISCUSS CAMBODIAN ISSUE WITH HIM AT SOME POINT. IN  
VIEW ARRIVAL OVER WEEKEND OF SIHANOUK DELEGATION I  
HAD SOUGHT MEET WITH HIM IMMEDIATELY. I ACKNOWLEDGED  
THAT TUNISIAN RECOGNITION OF SIHANOUK WAS FAIT ACCOMPLI,  
BUT SAID IT IMPORTANT GOT UNDERSTOOD USG POSTION IN  
LIGHT OF UPCOMING UNGA SESSION INVOLVING QUESTION OF  
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CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATION. SECRETARY HAD CHARGED ME TO

CONVEY TO FON MIN AND TO GOT HIS DISTRESS AT POSSIBILITY THAT UNGA MAY VOTE TO ADMIT GRUNK DELEGATION. I SAID USG BELIEVES EJECTION OF GKR DELEGATION WOULD HAVE SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECTS ON RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN CAMBODIA BY INTERPOSING UN ON SIDE OF THE INSURGENTS AND DISCOURAGING PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. EJECTION OF GKR WOULD ALSO SET DAMAGING PRECEDENT FOR UN, COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, AND RULE OF LAW AMONG NATIONS BY GIVING APPROVAL TO EXTERNATILLY FINANCE ARMED INSURGENCY. I SAID USG HOPES THAT GOT CAN ASSURE US IT WILL NOT JOIN IN EFFORTS TO REMOVE GKR FROM UNGA.

3. I THEN DISCUSSED FOLLOWING DETAILS IN SUPPORT OF OUR POSTION WHICH I COMMEDED TO FON MIN:

A. CAMBODIAN CONFLICT REMAINS UNSETTLED. GRUNK HAS BEEN UNSECCESFUL IN ITS INSURGENCY. GKR CONTINUES CONTROL AT LEAST 65 PERCENT OF POPULATION AND ENJOYS SUPPORT THAT POPULATION DESPITE ECONOMIC DISLOCATIONS. GKR IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE TO THE INSURGENCY AND GRUNK WILL NOT WIN MILITARY VICTORY.

B. GRUNK DOES NOT ENJOY POPULAR SUPPORT. IN AREAS GRUNK CONTROLS IT HAS CARRIED OUR FORCED COMMUNIZATION ACCORDING TO MARXIST-LENINIST DOCTRINES. POPULATION HAS REACTED BY TAKING REFUGE IN GKR CONTROLLED AREAS.

C. NEGOTIATION IS PROPER ROAD TO RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT. GKR HAS CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO END HOSTILITIES, AND USG APPLAUDS AND SUPPORTS THIS POSITION: BUT GRUNK HAS REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE, PREFERRING TO CONTINUE THE WAR. TO ADMIT GRUNK NOW IS TO REWARD REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE, A DAMAGING PRECEDENT.

D. INTERJECTION OF UN WILL NOT RESOLVE CONFLICT BECAUSE GRUNK, WHETHER IN OR OUT OF UNGA, WILL CONTINUE CONFRONT GKR'S CONTROL OF MAJORITY OF OPOULATION, NATIONAL CAPITAL, AND GOVERNMENT APPARATUS. GKR WILL CONTINUE CAPABLE OF DEFENDING ITS AREAS AND REMAINING PRINCIPAL POWER IN COUNTRY. BUT UN ADMISSION OF

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GRUNK WILL HARDEN GRUNK RESOLVE NOT TO NEGOTIATE, AND WILL DO NOTHING TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WHICH PROVOKED THE CONFLICT.

E. ACCEPTANCE OF GRUNK WOULD DAMAGE RULE OF LAW AMONG NATIONS. IT WOULD GIVE DIRECT APPROVAL TO INSURGENTS FINANCED AND DIRECTED FROM OUTSIDE. OTHER NATIONS WITH DISSIDENT , SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS SEEKING

OVERTHROW ESTABLISHED, LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS MAY BECOME  
SUBJECT TO SIMILAR INSURGENCY, FINANCED AND CONTROLLED  
BY UNFRIENDLY NEIGHBOR STATES, ONCE UN SHOWS ITSELF  
WILLING ACCEPT LEGITIMACY OF SUCH MOVEMENTS.

4. CHATTI LISTENED ATTENTIVELY THROUGHOUT PRESENTATION  
OF FOREGOING. HE OPENED HIS REPLY BY THANKING ME FOR  
MY STATEMENT AND POINTING OUT, WITH GENIAL SMILE, THAT  
GOT AND USG POSITIONS ON CAMBODIA DIFFER. HE SAID  
TUNISIA HAD BEGUN BY RECOGNIZING LON NOL GOVERNMENT AND  
HAD MAINTAINED THAT POSITION QUITE A WHILE. HOWEVER,  
IT HAD BECOME APPARENT THAT LON NOL REGIME HAD NOT  
BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH ITSELF FIRMLY, WHILE THE  
OTHER REGIME, WHICH WAS LEGITIMATE PRIOR TO LON NOL'S  
"COUP D'ETAT," HAD ESTABLISHED BOTH MORAL AND PHYSICAL  
AUTHORITY IN A LARGE PART OF THE COUNTRY. CHATTW  
ADMITTED THAT WHILE HE CONSIDERED THAT NO COUP D'ETAT  
IS LEGITIMATE, THERE ARE MANY COUNTRIES  
TODAY WHERE GOVERNMENTS WHO TOOK OVER BY COUP HAVE  
GAINED ACCEPTANCE WITHIN THEIR COUNTRIES, AND THEREFORE  
GAINED DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION.

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INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 IO-14 SAM-01 DRC-01 /120 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6809

INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

USUN NEW YORK 639

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TUNIS 5635/2

E.O. 11652: GDS

5. I COUNTERED NOTION THAT LON NOL GOVERNMENT WAS

RESULT OF COUP, DRAWING ON INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING FACT THAT SIHANOUK HAD APPOINTED MEMBERS OF GKR, AS WELL AS HANDPICKING MANY MEMBERS OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT HAD THEN, IN HIS PERSONAL POLICIES, MOVED OUT TO POSITIONS WHICH GKR DEEMED UNACCEPTABLE, WITH RESULT THAT GKR REMOVED SIHANOUK.

6. CHATTI WENT BACK TO PRINCIPAL POINTS IN MY DEMARCHE. HE SAID TUNISIA OF COURSE DOES NOT SUPPORT COMMUNISTS OR MARXIST-LENINIST REGIMES, BUT THAT IS NOT AN ISSUE HERE. BOURGUIBA'S POLICY IS TO RECOGNIZE GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE POPULAR SUPPORT. I REPLIED THAT WE CONSIDERED THAT KHMER REGIME HAS MORE INTERNAL SUPPORT AND IN ANY CASE OUR CONCERN IS THAT OUSTER OF GKR AT UNGA WOULD INCREASE THE DIFFICULTY OF BRINGING PEACE TO CAMBODIA AND DO HARM TO PRINCIPLE OF SETTLING DISPUTES BY NEGOTIATION.

7. CHATTI SAID GOT WOULD STUDY MATTER PROFOUNDLY. GOT FAVORS LEGALITY, THE RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO CHOOSE  
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THEIR GOVERNMENT, AND PROMOTION OF DIALOGUES AND NEGOTIATION AMON PEOPLES. HOWEVR, HE SAID PROPOSAL TO EVICT GKR WOULD NOT BE TOTALLY WITHOUT PRECEDENT. THERE HAD ONCE BEEN CASE OF TWO DISPUTING CONGO REGIMES BEFORE UN. HE AGREED WITH ME, HOWEVER, THAT CHINE CASE WAS AN EXCEPTION. HE SAID UNGA IS SOVEREIGN AND COMPOSED OF SOVEREIGN STATES, AND THE MAJORITY RULES.

8. I POINTED OUT THAT TUNISIAN VOTE, AMONG OTHERS, COULD BE CRUCIAL. CHATTI AGREED, NOTING THAT WAS WHY GOT HAD NOT YET TAKEN DECISION. CHATTI EMPHASIZED FACT THAT TUNISIA CANNOT IGNORE POSITIONS TAKEN BY "SEVERAL GROUPS," INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR ARAB COUNTRIES, AND WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH THEM BEFORE MAKING DECISION. CHATTI SAID HE WAS NOT FORECASTING GOT DECISION, BUT SIMPLY OUTLINING FOR ME THE FACTORS GOT MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE DECIDING.

9. REFERRING TO CHATTI'S REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS, I POINTED OUT THAT CERTAIN ARAB COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO SUPPORT GKR. I REITERATED THAT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT LON NOL CAME TO POWER THROUGH A COUP D'ETAT, THAT OUR INFORMATION IS THAT 65 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION NOW SUPPORT GK, AND THAT GKR RATHER THAN GRUNK MAINTAINS THE APPARATUS OF GOVERNMENT. I RECOGNIZED EXISTENCE OF DIFFERING VIEWS WORLDWIDE

REGARDING WHAT CONSTITUTES LEGITIMATE GOVT, BUT I REPEATED THAT THE ISSUE NOW REALLY IS NOT RPT NOT ONE OF RECOGNITION OR OF RESOLUTION OF A CONFLICT. NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE THE KEY, AND EVICTING GKR NOW WILL COMPLICATE ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. FONMIN RESPONDED THAT OF COURSE THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATION IS A FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF TUNISIAN POLICY.

10 I URGED UPON CHATTI THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK, TO WHICH CHATTI AGREED IMMEDIATELY. I EMPHASIZED VALUE WE PLACE ON FRANK EXCHANGES WITH GOT AND CHATTI EVOKED MUTUAL RESPECT AS HALLMARK OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. I SAID THAT CERTAINLY BOTH USG AND GOT  
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SEEK PEACE IN THE WORLD. FONMIN ADDED THAT LIBERTY AND THE PROMOTION OF LIBERAL REGIMES ARE IMPORTANT TO GOT WHICH DOES NOT WANT TO SEE COMMUNIST REGIMES MULTIPLY. I SAID THAT SIHANOUK THINKS HE CAN CONTROL HIS COMMUNIST SUPPORTERS, BUT THAT THIS PROPOSITION IS OPEN TO QUESTION.

11. FONMIN ENDED DISCUSSION STATING GOT WOULD CONSIDER MATTER DEEPLY AND TAKE DECISION IN LIGHT OF WHAT IT CONCLUDED WAS BEST FOR TUNISIA. HE MADE POINT OF EMPHASIZING THAT DECISION WOULD NOT BE ON BASIS OF "PERSONALITIES" (WHICH I TAKE AS REFERENCE TO PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN BOURGUIBA AND SIHANOUK). I LEFT AID MEMOIRE CLOSELY FOLLOWING POINTS PARA 3 ABOVE.

12. COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR THAT GRUNK FONMIN'S VISIT AND MESSAGE FROM SIHANOUK TO BOURGUIBA WAS DIRECTED AT PERSUADING GOT TO REAPPRAISE ITS POSITION OF ABSENCE/ABSTENTION ON KHMER CREDENTIALS ISSUE. MY DEMARCHE WAS TIMELY AND HOPEFULLY SERVED AS USEFUL COUNTERBALANCE TO GRUNK'S EFFORT. I BELIEVE CHATTI WHEN HE SAYS THAT FIRM DECISION NOT RPT NOT YET AKEEN AND THAT GOT WILL CONSIDER MATTER CAREFULLY. MORE "MISSIONARY" WORK AT UN WILL BE CALLED FOR BECAUSE IT VERY POSSIBLE NOT DECISION WILL BE MADE UNTIL ISSUE ACTUALLY ARISES IN NEW YORK AND GOT COUNTS HEADS.  
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## Message Attributes

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